地球科学进展 ›› 2026, Vol. 41 ›› Issue (5): 551 -566. doi: 10.11867/j.issn.1001-8166.2026.038

观点 上一篇    

G7关键矿产战略洞察及对中国的启示与建议
邵亚伟1,2(), 王丽贤3, 张志强1,2,3()   
  1. 1.中国科学院成都文献情报中心,四川 成都 610299
    2.中国科学院大学 经济与管理学院信息资源 管理系,北京 100190
    3.中国科学院新疆生态与地理研究所,新疆 乌鲁木齐 830011
  • 收稿日期:2026-03-31 修回日期:2026-04-29 出版日期:2026-05-10
  • 通讯作者: 张志强 E-mail:shaoyawei21@mails.ucas.ac.cn;zhangzq@clas.ac.cn
  • 基金资助:
    中国科协战略发展部项目(HT15022025486)

G7 Critical Minerals Strategies: Insights, Implications, and Recommendations for China

Yawei Shao1,2(), Lixian Wang3, Zhiqiang Zhang1,2,3()   

  1. 1.National Science Library (Chengdu), Chinese Academy of Sciences, Chengdu 610299, China
    2.Department of Information Resources Management, School of Economics and Management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China
    3.Xinjiang Institute of Ecology and Geography, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Urumqi 830011, China
  • Received:2026-03-31 Revised:2026-04-29 Online:2026-05-10 Published:2026-07-22
  • Contact: Zhiqiang Zhang E-mail:shaoyawei21@mails.ucas.ac.cn;zhangzq@clas.ac.cn
  • About author:Shao Yawei, research areas include theories, methods, and applications of information science; science and technology strategy and planning. E-mail: shaoyawei21@mails.ucas.ac.cn
  • Supported by:
    the Strategic Development Department of the China Association for Science and Technology(HT15022025486)

全球科技战略竞争日益加剧,与高新技术发展密切相关的关键矿产成为科技强国和大国之间博弈的重要战略变量,主要科技强国纷纷出台关键矿产战略,以维护和保障本国关键矿产供应链韧性与安全。聚焦关键矿产在全球高技术竞争与能源转型中的战略地位,系统研判七国集团(G7)关键矿产战略的发展动向、总体态势与演进逻辑。基于政策文本分析法,对七国集团成员国及其主要盟友的关键矿产战略、行动计划、合作协议和研究报告等政策文件进行综合解析。结果表明,七国集团通过联盟治理、拓展全球资源网络和“降低对华的依赖”等路径,对中国资源战略形成一定压力,但其内部仍存在利益分歧。七国集团的关键矿产战略总体呈现以供应链安全化、合作联盟化与规则标准化为核心的演进逻辑。中国可依托“一带一路”倡议构建战略性矿产资源命运共同体,推动全球关键矿产治理体系改革,通过制定完善新一轮国家战略性矿产资源发展战略,巩固供应链主导权与核心优势,加强与战略性矿产资源新兴国家的资源外交等举措,保障战略性矿产资源供应链韧性与安全,推动构建全球关键矿产治理新格局。

Global strategic competition in science and technology has intensified, and critical minerals closely related to the development of high-tech industries have become a major focus of competition among major powers. As a result, critical mineral strategies have been successively introduced by leading technological countries in order to enhance the resilience and security of their domestic critical mineral supply chains. The strategic role of critical minerals in global high-technology competition and the energy transition is examined, and the dynamics, overall trends, and evolving logic of G7 critical mineral strategies are systematically reviewed and analyzed. Through policy text analysis, strategic documents, action plans, cooperation agreements, and research reports issued by G7 countries and their major partners have been comprehensively analyzed. It is found that, through alliance-based governance, the expansion of global resource networks, and strategies aimed at reducing dependence on China, the G7 has exerted growing strategic pressure on China’s resource security and industrial supply chains, although divergences of interests remain evident. Overall, an evolutionary trajectory characterized by supply chain securitization, alliance-based cooperation, and rule standardization is observed. Greater efforts should be made to advance strategic mineral cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative, strengthen participation in the reform of global critical mineral governance, improve national strategic mineral development strategies, consolidate China’s leading position and core advantages in critical mineral supply chains, and deepen resource diplomacy with emerging mineral-producing countries. Through these measures, the resilience and security of China’s strategic mineral supply chains could be enhanced, and a more inclusive and stable global governance framework for critical minerals could be advanced.

中图分类号: 

表1 G7关键矿产战略的内部政策取向、外部治理路径及其国际影响
Table 1 Domestic policy orientationsexternal governance pathwaysand international impacts of G7 countries’ critical minerals strategies
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